Syria is no longer in the grip of the Assad dynasty for the first time in decades. In January 2025, a former rebel commander turned politician, Ahmed al-Sharaa, was sworn in as Syria’s interim president. His rise was a dramatic break from the Baʿathist facade of Syrian politics since the 1970s. But if Bashar al-Assad’s fall ushered in one era, then the establishment of al-Sharaa's transitional government has begun another - not so much transitional now as uncertain. In his first few months on the job, al-Sharaa has grappled with the country’s dueling pressures of domestic credibility, international diplomacy and economic salvation. What is at issue seldom has been so tangible: whether Syria’s long war yields a new and different country with reborn institutions or instead slides into a fresh version of old-style strongman rule will depend on how this perilous moment is managed.

Lifting Western sanctions became the centrepiece of Syria's effort to win legitimacy when Ahmed al-Sharaa addressed the UN General Assembly in New York on 23 September 2025. The emphasis is on the Caesar Act, which was signed into law in June 2020, and a tangle of EU restrictions targeting Syria's banking, construction, and energy industries. These were initially aimed at pressuring Bashar al-Assad, but today, they are choking off the possibility of post-conflict rebuilding in Syria under new leadership.

Al-Sharaa has repeatedly argued that without relief, there is no way to rebuild: electricity networks are working at less than 30 percent of their capacity, amid daily blackouts due to lack of fuel, and hospitals do not have the imports needed to operate. On 3 February 2025, he guessed that presidential elections would be four to five years away from organization, citing the lack of census data and institutional ability. He argues that a credible transition can only be led by external actors removing sanctions, or at least gradually suspending them for long enough to build back better.

But the world is wary. Some have demanded tangible changes in justice, rights, accountability - before assets are unfrozen or trade is allowed. Critics warn that relief may only embolden a government still untested in pluralism if relief comes too quickly. If it is not too late, ordinary Syrians will continue to bear the cost of shortages, unemployment and hunger.

Negotiating Peace or Conceding Sovereignty?

One of al-Sharaa’s most contentious moves has been starting high-stakes negotiations with Israel. By September 2025, U.S. envoys and Syrian negotiators were reportedly close to a security agreement that would reduce tension by grounding Israeli airstrikes and establishing buffer zones in the south. Some American officials even claimed the deal was “99 percent done”.

But the Israelis have been explicit about their conditions. They insist that any such deal include demilitarization of southern Syria and protection for the Druze in Suwayda. The talks have already stumbled over Israel's insistence on opening a humanitarian corridor in the south. Prime Minister Netanyahu rejected the complete withdrawal from various buffer areas as a "joke," indicating how precarious negotiations are.

“It is an issue of common sense,” says Al-Sharaa about the initiative. Officials emphasize that the deal would be closer to the 1974 Disengagement Agreement that brought a measure of stability on the Golan front, much like post-Camp David relations between Israel and Egypt in the ’80s and early ’90s than it would be a full-fledged normalization treaty. To many Syrians, however, the very notion of entering into negotiations with Israel touches a raw nerve - over sovereignty, memory and national dignity. An agreement could work to Syria’s advantage, adding heft to its waning influence in the world at home while raising concern among vital domestic constituencies.

The Framework of Transition and Those Who Oppose It

The 2025 Interim Constitution is the legal cornerstone of al-Sharaa's presidency, which he ratified on 13 March 2025 after a National Dialogue Conference in Damascus the month before. The declaration creates a five-year transition period that extends through 2030.

Some key provisions illustrate how much authority continues to be vested in the presidency:

• The head of state names judges, ministers, and many members of the People's Assembly.

• The constitution places Islamic law as the primary source of law.

• The office of the Prime Minister is abolished.

• Elections cannot be held until the end of the transition.

On 29 March 2025, al-Sharaa named a transitional technocrat government of 23 ministers. It featured token minority representation - an Alawite, a Druze, a Christian, and a Kurd and established two new ministries: Sports & Youth, and Emergency & Disaster Management. The government was sworn in under the protection of heavy security in Damascus.

But numerous groups, including the Kurdish-led authorities in the northeast, did not accept the government’s legitimacy. Its new system, they say, is abandoning federal guarantees and running the risk of replacing one strongman system with another. To them, centralization under al-Sharaa comes dangerously close to Assad’s footprint.

Diplomacy on All Fronts

Since taking office, al-Sharaa has been working to reposition Syria internationally. His September 2025 speech was the first time in about sixty years that a Syrian head of state personally addressed the UN General Assembly. In New York, he also spoke with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio about sanctions relief and Syria's return to the fold of international institutions.

In the same week, Syria restored ties with Ukraine, which had been cut under Assad. Russia, once a steadfast military backer of Assad, has also kept its distance and offered only "constructive" dialogue, wary that it might lose influence in the process.

On 10 March 2025, al-Sharaa signed a unification agreement with Mazloum Abdi and the Syrian Democratic Forces which pledged to absorb them into state institutions by year's end. The plan handed control of border crossings, airports and oil fields. But Kurdish groups have resisted, warning that without guarantees of autonomy, the combination could set off new fighting in the northeast.

The Road Ahead

The following months are pivotal. The first poll after Assad is expected in October 2025, but for a parliamentary election held under interim rules, not a full presidential vote. Even so, it will be the first time that people in Syria have had a chance to vote since 2021 and represent a test of whether the transitional government can pull off a widely seen legitimate exercise.

If al-Sharaa can get phased sanctions relief, start reconstruction, and maintain basic services, he might win some legitimacy at home and in international eyes. However, the structural role he has carved out in the interim constitution threatens to replace one strongman system hidden behind procedural change with another.

The Israel negotiations may be his riskiest bet. If they lead to actual security improvements, he will gain leverage and international stature. If they fail or foment backlash over sovereignty, he could be politically hobbled before the transition is half complete.

Finally, the northeast of Syria and Suwayda will serve as laboratories for inclusion. Without guarantees, Syria risks fragmenting, resisting central authority, or descending into renewed fighting.

The downfall of Assad was once unimaginable. That it has finally happened presents new opportunities as well as new risks. Ahmed al-Sharaa is not yet a historic figure, but the choices in front of him are indeed historic. The Syrian people, long trapped in cycles of war and repression, are waiting to see if this new trajectory will lead to alleviation or simply echo the country’s history.