Modern Japanese Identity: Leaving Asia and Catching Up with the West

How does a national identity emerge? How does it evolve into nationalism, imperialism, colonialism, and even fascism? Japan offers a striking case. From the Meiji Restoration to its domination of the Pacific and East Asia, and even after its defeat in World War II and Allied occupation, it staged another “miracle” through economic recovery. Yet these complicated histories raise a deeper question: what does it mean to be Japanese?

Cofiguration, as formulated by Atsuko Ueda from Naoki Sakai, provides a framework for understanding how Japan defines itself in relation to the West and the Rest of the world. From the Meiji period onward, Japan entered an international order dominated by Western powers and attempted to adopt Western models in order to achieve “civilization,” which, in Fukuzawa Yukichi’s words, was the highest stage in a hierarchical process. In this sense, Japan positioned itself as not yet fully civilized, and therefore in need of “catching up with the West” and “leaving Asia.” Following the victory in the Russo-Japanese War, this cofigurative relationship was reinforced through the consolidation of a collective “Japanese” identity (日本人, nihonjin), which in turn motivated a shift toward imperial expansion and the emergence of Pan-Asianism. In this context, Japan positioned itself against a Western-dominated global order while simultaneously reproducing similar hierarchical structures within Asia. This essay argues that modern Japanese identity was shaped through an ongoing process of cofiguration across multiple stages; it was not only the product of internal cultural evolution, but also deeply conditioned by global dynamics, resulting in a framework in which “the West and the Rest” remained an unavoidable reference point.

Japan’s interaction within the international order began in the Meiji period in 1868, when Meiji leaders and thinkers actively adopted Western models of modernization. The idea of modernization—articulated by Fukuzawa Yukichi—framed “civilization” as a hierarchical process with the West as its highest stage. During a remarkably short period of time, Japan established a constitutional monarchy based on the Prusso-German model, introduced a new education system, and experienced rapid industrialization and a rise as a military power. Railways, telegraph systems, and modern banking institutions were also introduced. However, this process also produced cultural and psychological tension, as seen in Natsume Sōseki’s Sanshirō, where individuals experience confusion in negotiating between Japanese and Western ways of life in the late Meiji era. Nevertheless, as Fukuzawa Yukichi argues, civilization is relative and can be understood in stages such as “semi-developed” and “primitive.” As he explains, “present-day China has to be called semi-developed in comparison with Western countries,” yet both China and mainland Japan can still be considered “civilized” when compared to “countries of South Africa” or the Ainu. In this sense, Japan is positioned as not yet fully developed in relation to the West, and therefore driven by the need to pursue further “civilization,” demonstrating that Japan’s modernization progress was fundamentally structured through a cofigurative relationship with the West.

Following the Russo-Japanese War in 1905—often recognized as the first international war of the twentieth century—this cofigurative identity was intensified rather than diminished. The defeat of a European power by a non-White nation was a global shock and demonstrated that Japan was able to “leave Asia” (脱亜論, Datsu-A Ron) and “catch up” with the West, thereby claiming a position of equality within a Western-dominated global order. The victory was made possible in part by Meiji militarization policies guided by the slogan “Enrich the country, strengthen the military” (富国強兵, fukoku kyōhei), but militarization was not only a state policy; it also functioned as a form of social education that coordinated society around national goals. The Imperial Army General Staff Office was created after the Prussian model of the Generalstab, in admiration for German military power after the Franco-Prussian War—another example of Japan’s ambitious goal of adopting Western models to defeat a Western power. As Naoko Shimazu argues in Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War, this period saw increasing mobilization of society around the idea of the nation, contributing to a more unified and self-conscious sense of being “Japanese” (nihonjin, 日本人). Therefore, Japan’s postwar identity did not move beyond cofiguration, but rather deepened it, as its recognition within the international order remained defined by a Western-centered framework.

The cofigurative relationship did not remain limited to Japan’s comparison with the West, but was extended to its relationship with other Asian countries through imperial expansion. Japan’s turn toward imperialism was driven in part by concerns over limited natural resources, as well as the desire to gain recognition and equality within a system of imperial competition dominated by Western powers. This dynamic is reflected in Japan’s rapid adoption of the British Royal Navy model in preparation for its own imperial expansion. As Japan established control over territories such as Taiwan, Korea, and later Manchuria, it began to position itself not only as equal to Western powers, but also as a hegemonic power within Asia. As Viren Murthy argues, Pan-Asianism emerged as a critique of Western imperialism, and its language framed Japan as the leader of Asia against Western domination. However, this anti-Western discourse remained structured by the same hierarchical logic it sought to oppose. A nationalist Japanese writer, Ōkawa Shūmei, who supported Pan-Asianism as a movement against Western imperialism and capitalism, also explicitly endorsed Japanese nationalism and imperial expansion, arguing that Japan should lead Asia. Takeuchi Yoshimi points out the dual nature of Japanese Pan-Asianism, which embodied anti-imperialist ideology while simultaneously making use of imperialist logic and propaganda. Therefore, although rejecting European power was central to Pan-Asianism, Japan in fact produced another “civilizational hierarchy” within Asia, placing itself above other societies and legitimizing its rule in terms of modernization and progress through assimilation. In doing so, it continued to exist not only in a cofigurative relationship with the West, but also with other non-Western countries.

In conclusion, modern Japanese identity is not the product of a linear process of internal development within Japanese society, but rather a long-term, ongoing process shaped through cofiguration. From the Meiji Restoration onward, Japan defined itself through a framework in relation to the West at every stage—from adopting Western models of “civilization,” to asserting equality after the Russo-Japanese War, to extending this logic through imperial expansion and Pan-Asianism. Even attempts to resist or reject Western modernity ultimately remained structured by it, as Japan reproduced similar hierarchical relations within Asia. As Naoki Sakai suggests, “the West is the regulative idea by which the Rest is evaluated.” Therefore, modern Japan should be understood not as an isolated national development, but as an identity formed through global dynamics in which the West remained an unavoidable reference point.